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I. INTRODUCTION

R

ECENT studies have suggested that insiders are availing themselves of
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 10b5-1(c) 1 trading plans
("Trading Plans" or "Plans") to beat the market by trading their own
company's shares based on material nonpublic information. 2 For years, the
SEC has been aware of industry concerns over the strategic use of these Plans
by insiders, 3 but it has hesitated to act. Congress is, however, poised to force
the agency's hand.
In January 2019, Financial Services Committee Chair Representative
Maxine Waters (D-CA) introduced a new bill, the Promoting Transparent
Standards for Corporate Insiders Act ("Corporate Insiders Act").4 If made
law, the Corporate Insiders Act would require the SEC to study a number of
proposed amendments to 10b5-1(c), 5 report to Congress, and implement the
results of that study through rulemaking. The bill was co-sponsored by
Representative Patrick McHenry (R-NC) and is therefore likely to receive
6
bipartisan support.
But there is a problem. The SEC adopted Rule 10b5-1(b) in 2000 to
define trading "on the basis of' material nonpublic information broadly as
trading with mere "awareness" of such information.7 The rule makers
anticipated concern from the courts that imposing liability on a person who is
merely aware of material nonpublic information while trading (without a
causal relation between the information and the trade) may not satisfy the
requirement of scienter under the general anti-fraud provisions of Section
1

17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(c) (2019).

2

Alan D. Jagolinzer, SEC Rule 1065-1 and Insiders' Strategic Trade, 55

3

4
5

6

7

MGMT. Sci. 224 (2009);

Tony Cooke & Serena Ng, Insiders
Proswer Debite SEC Rule, WALL ST. J. (Aug.5,2005,
12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB112320798601405793; Susan Pulliam &
Rob Barry, Executuves' Good Luck in Trading Own Stock, WALL ST.J. (Nov. 27, 2012, 11:17
PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390444100404577641463717344
178.
See, e.g.,
Letter from Jeff Mahoney, Gen. Counsel, Council of Institutional Inv'rs, to Mary
Jo White, Chairman, SEC (May 9, 2013), https://www.cii.org/files/issues and
advocacy/ correspondence/ 2013/ 05 09 13 ciiletter to sec rule 10b51 trading-plans.pdf.
Promoting Transparent Standards for Corporate Insiders Act, H.R. 624, 116th Cong. (1st
Sess. 2019).
H.R.624 § 2(a)(1)(A)-(F).
See Pete Schroeder, U.S. House Panel's Top Democrat, Republian Seek Executive Trading
Oversight, REUTERS Jan. 18, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-houseregulati6on/u-s-house-panels-top-democrat-republican-seek-executive-trading-oversightidUSKCN1PC295.
See 17 C.F.R.§ 240.10b5-1(b) (2019).
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10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act (and might therefore exceed the SEC's
statutory authority for regulating insider trading).8 There was also the concern
that the broad awareness test may chill legitimate trading by insiders (e.g., for
portfolio diversification), which would negatively impact the value of firm
shares as a form of executive compensation. To address these concerns, the
rule makers added Rule 10b5-1(c) Trading Plans as an affirmative defense to
insider trading liability. 9
To qualify, a Rule 10b5-1(c) Trading Plan must (1) be in writing;10 (2)
detail the amount, price, and date of the securities to be purchased or sold, or
include a "written formula or algorithm" that determines the Plan
transactions;11 (3) it must have been entered into while the insider was
unaware of material nonpublic information; 12 (4) the insider must not have
any subsequent influence "over how, when, or whether to effect [particular
Plan] purchases or sales"; 13 and, finally, (5) it must have been "entered into in
good faith."'14 Moreover, a purchase or sale is not "pursuant" to a qualified
Trading Plan if the trader "entered into or altered a corresponding or hedging
transaction or position with respect to those securities" trading under the
5
Plan.'
The SEC was well aware that an affirmative defense to insider trading for
those who execute their transactions through valid Trading Plans would (1)
make it harder to detect insiders who hide their illegal trades by executing
them through invalid Trading Plans that were adopted based on material
nonpublic information, and would (2) provide a loophole in the law for
others to strategically terminate otherwise valid Plans based on material
nonpublic information. 16 The SEC presumably decided that the evil of

to
it

Just prior to the SEC's adoption of Rule 10b5-1(b) in 2000, the Eleventh Circuit rejected
the SEC's preferred knowing possession test for insider trading liability as exceeding the
agency's statutory authority pursuant to Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act. SEC v. Adler,
137 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 1998). The Ninth Circuit soon followed the Eleventh Circuit in
rejecting the SEC's knowing possession test in United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051,
1070 (9th Cir. 1998).
See John P. Anderson, Antwdpang a Sea Changefor Insider Tra&ng Law: From Trading Plan
Crisis to Rat'onal Reform, 2015 UTAH L. REV. 339, 341 (2015). This author anticipated many
of the reforms proposed by the Corporate Insiders Act in this 2015 article, and raised
some of the same concerns detailed below in Section I.A-C of this article. See id. at 37178.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10o5-1(c)(1)(i)(B)(2).
Id. § 240.10b-l(c)(1)(i)(B)(1)-(2).

13

Id. § 240.10b5-1(c)(1)(i)(A), (B)(3).
Id. § 240.10b5-1(c)(1)(i)(B)(3).

14

Id. § 240.10b5-1(c)(1)(ii).

15

Id. § 240.10b5-1(c)(1)(i)(C).

16

See Michael Siconolfi & Jean Eaglesham, SEC Is Pressed to Revamp Executive Trading Plans,

12
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strategic use of Trading Plans was worth the prize of increased flexibility in
enforcement that would come with the broad awareness test. In sum, the
adoption of Rule 10b5-1 was, in a manner of speaking, a deal with the devil
that the SEC and some lawmakers now appear to regret having made. The
problem is that, as is often the case with such a deal, it cannot be easily
undone.
Below, I identify challenges presented by the restrictions on Trading Plan
use that Congress has proposed in the Corporate Insiders Act. In light of
these challenges, I argue that effective Trading Plan reform cannot be
accomplished by simply restricting the use of Trading Plans while leaving
Rule 10b5-1(b)'s awareness test in place. If there is to be reform, it should be
comprehensive. If neither the SEC nor Congress desires comprehensive
reform of our current insider trading regime, however, I conclude by offering
the consolation that permitting insiders to continue to use Trading Plans
strategically may not be so bad after all. Perhaps even a deal with the devil can
be worked for the good of investors.

II. CHALLENGES FOR THE PROPOSED REFORM
If signed into law, the Corporate Insiders Act would require the SEC to
carry out a study of whether Rule 10b5-1(c) should be amended to:
*
*
*
*
*

Only permit insiders to adopt Trading Plans during an issueradopted trading window.'7
Limit insiders' ability to adopt multiple Trading Plans.18
Impose "a mandatory delay between the adoption of a trading
plan and the execution of the first trade" under the Plan. 19
Limit the frequency with which insiders may modify or cancel
20
Trading Plans.
Require insiders to file Trading Plan adoptions, amendments,
2
terminations, and transactions with the SEC. '

WALL ST. J. (May 9, 2013, 8:54 PM) (quoting former SEC commissioner Joseph

17

'8
'9
20

Grundfest stating that the weaknesses inherent to Trading Plans were "well known" by
the
commission
and
its
staff
at
the
time
of
adoption),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324059704578473382576553460.
Promoting Transparent Standards for Corporate Insiders Act, H.R. 624 § 2(a)(1)(A),
116th Cong. (1st Sess. 2019).
Id.§ 2(a)(1)(B).
Id.§ 2(a)(1)(C).
Id.§ 2(a)(1)(D).
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Require boards of issuers that have adopted Trading Plans to (1)
adopt Trading Plan policies; (2) monitor Plan transactions; and
(3) ensure that Trading Plan policies include guidelines on equity
22
hedging, holding, and ownership.
The following sections address legal and practical challenges for these
proposals.
A. Limiting Adoption to Trading Windows and Imposing Mandatory
Delays
Amending Rule 10b5-1(c) to limit the adoption of Trading Plans to
issuer-imposed trading windows 2 3 and to impose a mandatory delay between
Plan adoption and the first trade under the Plan would certainly make it more
difficult for insiders to hide illegal trades through Trading Plans. The legal and
practical price of such reform would, however, be quite high.
First, limiting the adoption of Trading Plans to issuer-imposed trading
windows would make it more difficult for insiders to avail themselves of the
10b5-1(c) affirmative defense while effecting legitimate trades in good faith.
Imagine that two days after the issuer's trading window closes and a threeweek blackout period begins, an executive learns her child is in need of a
major operation in four weeks. The executive needs to sell some of her firm
shares to cover the expense of the operation. Assume that the executive is not
aware of any material nonpublic information at that moment, but she knows
she may be aware of such information in one month's time. Under the
current regime, the executive could simply enter into a Trading Plan that will
execute in one month's time. Under the proposed revisions, however, the
Trading Plan would not be an option and the executive would be left with the
following unappealing alternatives: If she trades now (while unaware of
material nonpublic information), she risks termination for violating her firm's
blackout period. If, however, she waits three weeks for the trading window to
open, she faces the very real risk that she will become "aware" of material
nonpublic information by that time. If she does become aware of material
21
22
23

Id. § 2(a)(1)(E).
Id. § 2(a)(1)(F).
Trading windows are issuer-dictated periods during which company employees are
permitted to trade company shares. They usually open immediately after the
announcement of the issuer's quarterly filings (when employees are least likely to be aware
of material nonpublic information) and close prior to the close of the next quarter (when
employees are more likely to possess material nonpublic information).
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nonpublic information by the time she trades, she nill be exposed to insider
trading liability pursuant to Rule 10b5-1(b) despite the fact that her trading
was not caused by the information she possesses and is entirely free of
scienter.
Similarly, one can see how imposing a mandatory delay between adoption
and first trade will generate the same problem. Mandatory delays of three to
six months have been suggested by commentators. 24 But note how such a
delay would render Trading Plans useless to the executive in the example
above. Again, she knows she will need to sell her shares in one month. She is
not aware of material nonpublic information today, but she cannot trade due
to the blackout period. If she waits until the trading window opens in one
month, she may then be aware of material nonpublic information and will not
be able to trade. This is precisely the type of scenario Trading Plans are
intended to address, but in this case a three-month delay requirement would
render trading plans useless.
Second, any limitations placed on the liquidity of shares issued as
compensation (whether by limiting Plan adoptions to trading windows or
imposing a mandatory delay) will make those shares less valuable to
employees. Such restrictions will therefore force firms to offer more shares as
compensation to achieve the same remunerative effect. Limiting the adoption
of Trading Plans to trading windows can therefore be expected to come at a
cost to the issuer and its shareholders. To address these added costs, firms
may be incentivized to broaden their trading windows (and therefore increase
the risk of improper insider trading outside of Trading Plans) or decrease
reliance on equity as a form of compensation (and therefore deprive
themselves of a useful tool for aligning the interests of management and
shareholders). Regulators should consider whether these are incentives they
want to create.
B. Limiting the Adoption of Multiple Trading Plans and Limiting
Termination of Existing Plans
Presumably the proposal to limit the adoption of multiple Trading Plans
is aimed at preventing the practice of hedging one Trading Plan against

24

E.g., Mahoney, supra note 3; Sougata Mukheree, The Dagerous Game Coporate Executives
Are
Plajjug
TRIANGLE
Bus.
J.
(Dec.
11,
2012,
2:29
PM),
https://www.bizjoumals.com/triangle/blog/2012/12/the-dangerous-gamecorporate.html.
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another.25 But, as noted above, 10b5-1 already expressly prohibits such
hedging,26 so adding this requirement does nothing more than make it more
difficult to violate existing law. Any benefits derived from such a prophylactic
measure must, however, be weighed against the opportunity costs of the new
restriction. There are many legitimate reasons an insider might wish to adopt
multiple overlapping Trading Plans. For example, most Trading Plans are
more than one year in duration-indeed some commentators have suggested
that Plans that are less than one year in duration are "aggressive." 27 If the
presumption is that most conservative Trading Plans will be long term, then
one must expect that, as personal, world, and market events change over the
years, an insider's investment needs may warrant the adoption of a second,
long-term, overlapping Trading Plan (or even a third) without the termination
of the original Plan. Such flexibility to adopt multiple Trading Plans would be
even more important if, as the Corporate Insider Act also proposes,
limitations are placed on the ability of insiders to terminate existing Plans.
Limitations on termination of Trading Plans would presumably be
implemented in response to studies indicating that insiders are strategically
terminating Trading Plans based on material nonpublic information.28 But if
new restrictions make it more difficult for insiders to terminate an existing
long-term Trading Plan, and they are also unable to adopt an overlapping plan
(also due to new restrictions), then their hands will be tied in the event of a
needed change in investment strategy (whether to address changes in market
trends or personal status).
Thus, just as limiting adoptions to trading windows and imposing
mandatory delays might end up having the unintended consequence of
forcing firms to broaden trading windows, proscribing overlapping Trading
Plans and limiting the termination of existing Plans may have the unintended
consequence of forcing insiders to adopt more aggressive, short-term Plans in
25

For example, an insider might set up two plans--one to sell 2000 shares of ABC the day

26

before the next earnings announcement and another to buy 2000 shares on that same
date. The insider could then wait to see how events transpire. If, based on newly acquired
material nonpublic information, it appears that the firm's earnings will beat analyst
expectations, the insider may terminate the sell Plan and leave the buy Plan in place. If it
appears the firm will disappoint, the insider may leave the sell Plan in place, but terminate
the buy plan.
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(c)(1)(i)(C) (2019).
Ed Welsch, Trading Plans Offer a Good Clue to Se/l-Aggressive 1ObS-5s Esbecza/9 Predict
Undeperformance,
WALL
ST.
J.
(Apr.
9,
2008,
12:01
AM),
https://www.wsj .coM/articles /SB120770890145300645.
See Jesse M. Fried, Insider Abstention, 113 YALE L.J. 455, 456-57 (2003); see also, Allan
Horwich, The Orgin, Appcaion, Va&20, and PotentialMAsuse of Rule 10b5- 1, 62 Bus. LAW.
913, 950-51 (2007);Jagolinzer, supra note 2, at 227.

27

28
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order to ensure sufficient flexibility to address unforeseen personal or market
exigencies. Moreover, the harder these restrictions make it for insiders to avail
themselves of Trading Plans as an affirmative defense for insider trading, the
more likely it is that those who are aware of material nonpublic information,
but who trade for entirely innocent reasons, will nevertheless incur insider
trading liability without scienter under the 10b5-1 awareness test. Again, such
a result would threaten the statutory authority for the rule.
C. Mandatory Disclosure
The Corporate Insiders Act proposes that the SEC consider whether
issuers and their employees should be required to file Trading Plan adoptions,
amendments, terminations and transactions with the SEC. 29 There are no
disclosure requirements for Trading Plans under the current regime. A rule
requiring disclosure of the establishment, termination, and modification of
Trading Plans by directors and executive officers was proposed by the SEC in
2002, but never adopted.30 At that time, the stated rationale for the rule was
that "current reports disclosing that a director or executive officer has entered
into, modified or terminated a Rule 10b5-1 [Trading Plan] .. . may provide
investors with more extensive disclosure of potentially useful information as
31
to management's views of the performance and prospects of the company."
But there are significant concerns raised by any such disclosure requirement.
To begin, the presumed rationale for the disclosure requirement (that it
will provide useful "information as to management's views of the
performance prospects of the company" 32 ) is difficult to reconcile with the
role of Trading Plans as an affirmative defense to insider trading liability.
After all, Trading Plans may only be adopted by insiders while they are
unaware of material nonpublic information and are therefore only trading to
either diversify their portfolio or to address a personal need. Consequently,
disclosure of Trading Plan adoptions will only give investors useful
information concerning the performance prospects of the company if they
are used improperly. Such a disclosure regime seems Kafka-esque in the
29

30

31
32

Promoting Transparent Standards for Corporate Insiders Act, H.R. 624, 116th Cong. (1st
Sess. 2019).
See Horwich, supra note 28, at 934-35 (noting that although the SEC proposed that certain
Plans should be disclosed, and that proposal was "never formally withdrawn," the
proposal "appears to have been consigned to oblivion").
Form 8-K Disclosure of Certain Management Transactions, Securities Act Release No.
8090, Exchange Act Release No. 45742 (proposed Apr. 12, 2002).

Id.
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extreme, and it would likely generate more confusion than clarity for
investors.
As just explained, for the disclosure requirement to make sense, we must
presume that insiders are abusing them on a regular basis. But even so, it
must be assumed that they will at least sometimes be used properly. The
disclosure of proper Plans in such an environment may, however, have the odd
result of misleading the public into assuming that material nonpublic
information is causing the planned trades when it is not. Similarly, disclosure
of a Trading Plan termination that was not based on material nonpublic
information may also send a false message to an investing public that is
conditioned to expect that such terminations are informed.
Finally, in an attempt to dissuade insider trading based on material
nonpublic information, the proposed disclosure requirement for Trading
Plans may have the unintended consequence of increasing the risk of the far
more harmful practice of market manipulation. Insider trading pushes the
price of an issuer's shares in the direction of their true value. 33 Insiders who
engage in market manipulation, by contrast, take action to push the price of
the issuer's shares away from their true value. 34 If market participants react to
Trading Plan adoptions as an indication of the future prospects of an issuer,
insiders could use these Plans as a means of intentionally misleading the
market and manipulating share prices. Executives could, for example, adopt
and disclose Trading Plans with large purchase orders for no other reason
than to drive share prices up in advance of the trades.
These concerns may help explain why the disclosure requirement
proposed in 2002 was never adopted. Regardless, these concerns offer good
reason for cautioning against the adoption of a similar disclosure requirement
proposal today.
D. Mandatory Compliance
Of the Corporate Insiders Act's proposed reforms, the least troublesome
is the requirement that issuers adopt internal policies concerning their
employees' use of Trading Plans. After all, it is the corporation that stands the
most to lose from insiders' strategic use of Trading Plans. Under at least one
theory of insider trading liability-the misappropriation theory-the principal
harm done by such trading is that it deprives the issuer of the exclusive use of

33
34

See JOHN P. ANDERSON, INSIDER TRADING: LAW, E, AND REFORM 196

See id. at 29-31.

(2018).
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its own proprietary information. 35 For this reason, issuers would certainly be
remiss if they failed to monitor their employees' adoption and use of Trading
Plans.
Interestingly, however, scholars have shown that issuers are already
keeping a very close eye on their employees' strategic use of Trading Plans;
indeed, in some cases they appear to be complicit in it! For example,
Professor M. Todd Henderson explains that boards appear to actually
"bargain" with executives over constraints on the use of Trading Plans when
setting executive pay.36 Some issuers grant their executives more latitude to
trade in the firm's shares than others, and studies show that firms with very
restrictive insider trading policies pay their executives about 13% more in
total compensation. 3 On the flip side, Professor Henderson's study shows
that firms with more liberal insider trading policies tend to pay their
employees a lesser amount of total compensation that roughly offsets the
profits earned from their (perhaps informed) trading in firm shares,
suggesting that these liberal trading policies are being offered to employees as
"implicit compensation." 38
If Professor Henderson and others are correct in concluding that issuers
have been negotiating liberal (perhaps even strategic) use of Trading Plans as
part of executive pay packages for some time, then it seems firms are already
effectively monitoring Trading Plans in the absence of regulatory incentives.
Nevertheless, the requirement that firms adopt written policies making such
compensation practices explicit would improve transparency and better
inform market participants of firms' executive compensation philosophies.
III. WHAT'S THE PATH FORWARD?
The previous section raised serious worries for the reforms proposed by
the Corporate Insiders Act, but, given Congress's concern over the strategic
use of Trading Plans, what is to be done? One solution is to eliminate the
10b5-1(b) awareness test for insider trading liability. Again, 10b5-1(c) Trading
Plans were only adopted to offer an affirmative defense in circumstances
35

36

37
38

See, e.g., United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 654 (1997) ("A company's confidential
information ... qualifies as property to which the company has a right of exclusive use.
The undisclosed misappropriation of such information, in violation of a fiduciary duty...
constitutes fraud akin to embezzlement.") (citation omitted).
M. Todd Henderson, Insider Tra&ng and CEO Pay, 64 VAND. L. REv. 505, 506-07 (2011).
Darren T. Roulstone, The Relation Between Insider-Tra&ng Restictions and Executive
Compensaion, 41 J. AcCT. RES. 525, 540 (2003).
Henderson, supra note 36, at 506-07.
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where the broad awareness test would impose liability despite the fact that the
insider's trade was not caused by material nonpublic information. If the
awareness test were replaced with an explicit requirement that liability may
only be imposed on proof of a causal connection between the material
nonpublic information and the trade, then the Corporation Insiders Act's
proposed rule-based restrictions on the use of Trading Plans could be
adopted without running afoul of Section 10(b)'s demand of scienter, and
without a significant chilling effect on legitimate trading by corporate
executives.
Alternatively, Congress could act to replace our current fraud-based
insider trading regime (with its requirement of scienter) with an equal-access
statutory regime similar to the European model.3 9 Under an equal-access
model, the law would simply prohibit trading by anyone who is aware of
material nonpublic information from sources that are closed to other market
participants. 40 Since it is not fraud-based, the equal-access model can impose
insider trading liability without demanding proof of scienter. Indeed, Senators
Jack Reed and Bob Menendez recently sponsored a bill that would impose
just such an equal-access regime. The Stop Illegal Insider Trading Act would
amend Section 10 of the Securities Exchange Act to make it illegal to
"purchase, sell, or cause the purchase or sale of any security on the basis of
material information that the person knows or has reason to know is not
publicly available."' 41 With statutory authority for such an equal-access model
in place, the SEC would be free to limit access to the Trading Plan affirmative
defense however it wishes without running afoul of the demands of scienter.
Of course, an insider trading ban so broad in reach would still risk
diminishing the value of shares offered to corporate insiders as compensation
(for the reasons suggested above), especially if complemented by a Trading
Plan defense narrowed in the ways suggested by the Corporate Insiders Act.
Unlike Europe, 42 the United States has a well-earned reputation for enforcing
its insider trading laws aggressively, with stiff civil and criminal penalties. 43 As
a result, the concern that so broad a prohibition might have a significant
chilling effect on legitimate trading (and therefore diminish the value of the

39

See ANDERSON, supra note 33, at 122-24.

40

See id.
Stop Illegal Insider Trading Act, S. 702, 114th Cong. (2015).
See ANDERSON, supra note 33, at 136.

41
42

43

See, e.g.,
Stephen M. Bainbridge, IncorporaingState Law Fiduciay Duties into the FederalInsider
Trading Prohibition,52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1189, 1191 (1995) (noting that insider trading
"carries penalties that can only be described as draconian").
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shares themselves) is perhaps greater in the U.S. than it is in Europe. This
may help to explain why the Senate bill has failed to gain momentum.
If,however, the SEC wishes to preserve its awareness test, and Congress
does not plan to introduce a new statutory regime, there may be no
alternative but to leave the existing affirmative defense for Trading Plans in
place, despite the fact that we know these Plans are sometimes used
strategically. But, in light of the fact that, as noted above, issuers appear
complicit in the strategic use of these Plans by their employees, one must
wonder whether this is such a bad thing. If issuers are negotiating employees'
strategic use of Trading Plans in setting compensation, then they are well
aware that the company's information is being so used and do not object, so
who is harmed? Under the misappropriation theory, insider trading liability is
only incurred if the trader fails to first disclose the intent to trade to the
source of the information-in this case, the issuer.44 If indeed insiders are
disclosing their intent to trade strategically to issuers when adopting a Plan,
there would appear to be no violation. The analysis is more complicated
under the classical theory of insider trading liability, where the insider's duty
4
to disclose is to the counterparty (a current or prospective shareholder). 5
Even there, however, the duty to disclose could presumably be satisfied with
an ex ante announcement by issuers that they are permitting strategic use of
Trading Plans as part of their executive compensation packages, as well a
46
post-trade disclosure of profits earned by insiders through Trading Plans.
Such a disclosure regime would put all market participants on notice of which
firms are permitting the strategic use of Trading Plans, and the extent of that
use.

47

Some may not be convinced that such notice would be sufficient to
satisfy the duty to disclose under the classical theory. Even so, it is difficult to
pinpoint the harm or deception to the issuer or counterparty in such trading.48
Most who would object to the strategic use of Trading Plans with these
disclosures would object to all trading based on information that is not
available to the investing public, but our fraud-based insider trading regime
has never been so broad in reach. 49 There is no Section 10(b) insider trading
See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652-53 (1997).
See id.
46
This author previously proposed just such a disclosure requirement for Trading Plans. See
Anderson, supranote 9,at 380-82.
47 Id.at 384-85.
48
Id.at 382-83.
49 See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 233 (1980) (stating that the formulation of a
broad "parity-of-information" rule, which "departs radically from the established doctrine
44
45
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liability without fraudulent deception.50 Again, if we want an insider trading
regime that does not require proof of fraud, then Congress will have to act.
IV. CONCLUSION
Congress must decide on the insider trading enforcement regime it wants.
If it wants a fraud-based regime, then the SEC's implementation and
enforcement must satisfy the demands of scienter. If, however, Congress
wants an equal-access regime (without the requirement of scienter), then it
need only pass a statute defining insider trading along the lines of the
European model. What Congress and the SEC should not do, however, is
maintain the current Rule 10b5- 1(b) awareness test while eviscerating the Rule
10b5-1(c) Trading Plan affirmative defense. Such a move would likely exceed
the SEC's statutory authority under Section 10(b). It would also significantly
diminish the value of equity as compensation to corporate insiders, which
would in turn force issuers to either issue more shares to achieve the same
remunerative effect, or give up on equity as compensation altogether. Neither
option would be good for issuers or shareholders.
The SEC may have made a deal with the devil when it bought its Rule
10b5-1(b) awareness test at the price of introducing Trading Plans as an
affirmative defense to insider trading. Nevertheless, if issuers are monitoring
the strategic use of these Plans, discounting executive compensation packages
accordingly, and made to disclose this compensation to market participants,
then maybe it was not such a bad deal after all.

50

that duty arises from a specific relationship between two parties . . . should not be
undertaken absent some explicit evidence of congressional intent") (citation omitted).
Id. at 234-35 (noting that though Section 10(b) was designed as a catchall, "what it
catches must be fraud").

